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Abstract
In this work we provide a theoretical overview of a search equilibrium model
with continuous productivity dispersion and perform its estimation for the Aus-
trian data. We describe empirically the dynamics of market equilibrium out-
comes. Special emphasis is made on the analysis of changes in labour mobility
and dependence of expected job durations on offered wages. We investigate the
influence of excessive labour mobility on the equilibrium profits of firms. Facing
a problem of top-coded wage data, we suggest an appropriate adjustment of the
existing estimation methodology. Finally, we extend the econometric model for
the observed heterogeneity of agents.
JEL Classification: J64
1 Introduction
In the present paper we perform a structural estimation of a search equilibrium
model with wage posting. We use the results to analyze the changes in equilibrium
outcomes, that occurred in the Austrian labor market over the last decade.
Recent advances in the theoretical search equilibrium modelling trigger a wave of
applied work. Considerable part of it is connected to estimation of Burdett-Mortensen
type of models, where equilibrium wage offer is determined through a solution of a
wage-posting game among competing employers. This version is especially suitable
to empirical studies, since it endogenously generates continuous theoretical wage offer
and earnings distributions. Those can be related to the observed wage and duration
data, providing rather simple identification and estimation of the structural param-
eters of a theoretical model. Among many others working in this area Bowlus et
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al. (1995), (2001) explore equilibrium wage distributions in the model with hetero-
geneous producers. Within this framework they study the speed of transition from
school to work, and wage differentials of college graduates in the US. Koning et al.
(1995) use the model to study structural and frictional unemployment and describe
the effects of minimum wage policy experiments in the Netherlands. Ridder and van
den Berg (1998) perform a survey of employment and unemployment durations of
Dutch employees. Special emphasis deserve contributions of Bontemps et al. (1999),
(2000) who develop a simple and powerful nonparametric procedure for the model,
where heterogeneity of the demand side is characterized by a continuous productivity
distribution.
The goal of the present paper is to provide an empirical description of equilibrium
outcomes in the Austrian labor market at two different points of time and see in which
direction the changes evolve. In our study we focus mainly on the three indicators of
labor market performance. First of all we analyze changes in the expected unemploy-
ment durations predicted by the model. The question of interest here is whether the
search theoretic framework is capable of grasping the recent big increases in observed
unemployment duration. Secondly, we focus on changes in career advancement, job
to job transitions and speed of climbing up the earnings ladder. On the job search and
dependence of job duration on potential future earnings make the selected theoretical
environment especially appropriate for this investigation. This aspect of our study
is also important in view of the other empirical surveys of the job mobility in Aus-
tria. Mayrhuber and Url (1999), for instance, find that job mobility in the last years
became surprisingly high. Thus, in our search equilibrium framework we will try to
identify, which factors exactly contribute to the increased employed search activity of
the labor supply side. Eventually, we will analyze the changes in profitability of the
firms and their monopsony power in wage setting. The question we address here is
again risen by Mayrhuber and Url (1999). Recording a considerable increase in labor
mobility they ask which effect this can have on equilibrium profits of companies, who
may invest in training. Or, addressing this issue from the efficiency wage viewpoint,
are the efficiency wages efficient enough to keep workers for sufficiently long time and
not loose from early quits. The answer to this question could be given in a search
equilibrium framework, where the firms profit is a part of a steady-state solution.
Looking into the profit changes over time we will try to give such an answer in this
paper.
In the present paper we estimate the model with continuous productivity dis-
persion using the nonparametric methodology of Bontemps et al. (2000). We also
consider the issue of the robustness of the model to parametric assumptions on equi-
librium offer and productivity distributions.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section provides a brief theoretical
overview of the model. The third section describes the data. In the fourth section
we describe the estimation methodology. The fifth section presents the results of the
work and their discussion. In the conclusion we summarize the main findings.
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2 The Model
The model incorporates both labor supply side (workers) and labor demand side
(employers) who meet on the market. Workers search for jobs and employers offer job
opportunities. Both types of agents are rational. Workers maximize their utility of
being employed and employers maximize their profits.
Workers utility U(w) is an increasing function of wage1 earned. Workers are
homogeneous with respect to their opportunity cost of employment (b) and therefore
have the same reservation wage (R). There are two states in which workers can be,
namely, ”employment” and ”unemployment”, and workers search whenever employed
or unemployed. Change of states is assumed to follow Poisson process. Transition
from current to a better paid job is also qualified as a change of state, so there
are three Poisson arrival rates that govern all transitions in the working history.
We define arrival rates of a job offer to unemployed and employed worker as λ0
and λ1 respectively. Arrival rate of a layoff is δ. Search process of an individual
is formalized as a repeated drawing of job offers from some distribution F (w) and
acceptance or rejection of the offer after each draw. It is important to notice that
rejected wage offers are unobserved. Available earnings data are just current salaries
of employed individuals and so are necessarily accepted wages. Therefore instead of
offer distribution F (w) only earnings distribution G(w) can be observed.
Searching workers face an optimal stopping problem. If an agent is unemployed,
Mortensen and Neumann (1988) show that the solution for this problem is a reserva-
tion wage
R = b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫ w
R
F¯ (x)
δ + r + λ1F¯ (x)
dx (1)
where F¯ (x) = 1 − F (x), supp(F ) = [R,w] and r is an interest rate. If an agent
is employed, the solution is to accept any wage greater than that currently earned.
This constitutes workers prescription for utility maximizing behavior. Following
Mortensen and Neumann (1988) without loss of generality we can associate λ0 and
λ1 that satisfy (1) with agents optimal search intensities.
To formulate the employers problem we start with two important findings, both
due to Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Let U be a steady state number of unemployed
workers, M – total number of supplying agents and N – steady state number of
active firms. Then in equilibrium the probability of encountering an unemployed
agent is U/M = δ (δ + λ0)
−1. Moreover, in equilibrium there exists an unambiguous
dependence between unobserved offer and observed earnings distribution (F,G) and
density (f, g) functions
F¯ (w) =
δ [1−G(w)]
δ + λ1G(w)
f(w) =
δ (δ + λ1)
[δ + λ1G(w)]
2 g(w) (2)
These identities make possible to derive the amount of workers l attracted in the
1We use the terms ”wage”, ”income” and ”earnings” interchangeably. In all cases income before
tax is meant.
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steady state by any offered wage w
l(w) =
M − U
N
δ (δ + λ1)[
δ + λ1F¯ (w)
]2 = M − UN [δ + λ1G(w)]2δ (δ + λ1) (3)
l(w) already depends on the unknown search intensity parameters. Employers now
face a problem of maximizing their profit with respect to wage paid
pi = max
w
(p− w)l(w) (4)
with l given by (3). In the considered version of the model employers are heteroge-
neous with respect to their productivity. The probability distribution of productivity
across active firms Γ(p), is assumed to be continuous, supp(Γ) = [p, p]. Bontemps et
al. (2000) show that under continuity assumption there exists a unique single valued,
monotone and continuous function w = K(p), which maps the support of the pro-
ductivity distribution into the support of the wage offer distribution. This implies
that each p-type firm offers only one wage, which rules out discontinuity of the wage
offer distribution, immanent to the models with discrete productivity dispersion. Ex-
istence and uniqueness of K(p) allows expressing first order conditions for firms in
terms of firms productivity. Indeed, taking the derivative of (4) with respect to w,
and using some algebra single firm optimality conditions become
p = w +
δ + λ1F¯ (w)
2λ1f(w)
= w +
δ + λ1G(w)
2λ1g(w)
(5)
where p is a known firm-specific constant. Bontemps et al. (2000) show that using
FOC in (5) one can derive the probability density of the productivity levels of firms,
operational in equilibrium
γ(p) =
2λ1f(w)3
λ1f(w)2 − f ′(w)[δ + λ1F¯ (w)] (6)
=
2δλ1(δ + λ1)g(w)3
3λ1g(w)2[δ + λ1G(w)]2 − g′(w)[δ + λ1G(w)]3
Moreover, they use equation (5) to find an optimal wage offer of a firm with given
productivity level p, i.e. find K(p). Provided that in equilibrium F (w) = Γ(p) a
solution for the optimal equilibrium wage offer is:
wopt = K(p) = p−
[
δ + λ1Γ¯(p)
]2 ∫ p
R
dx[
δ + λ1Γ¯(x)
]2 (7)
Bontemps et al. (2000) show that whenever an upper bound of the support of the
wage offer density is finite there exists at least one equilibrium on the market. A
formal definition of market equilibrium concludes the theoretical overview.
Definition 1 A market search equilibrium is a triple {F (w),W,Kp} such that:
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1) The distribution of wage offers is F (w) =
∫
F (w|p)dΓ(p), where Γ(p) is a
productivity distribution of firms, active in the market
2) W = max{R,wcurrent} is the workers best response to firms wage-posting be-
havior; R defined in (1)
3) Kp = argmax{pi(p, w)|R ≤ w ≤ w} is a set of profit-maximizing wages posted
in equilibrium by each p-type firm; pi(p, w) defined in (4) and Kp defined in (7)
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that for any p-type firm the unique offer
distribution F (w|p) that satisfies Definition 1 is given by
F (w|p) = 1 + κ1
κ1
[
1−
√
p− w
p− wmin
]
(8)
Theoretical description above represents the equilibrium solution exclusively in
terms of structural parameters and employers productivity. In the most straight-
forward case, researcher may use productivity data and, assuming some parametric
form for Γ(p), construct the likelihood function. In case only wage data are avail-
able, some more elaboration will be required to compute the equilibrium wage offer
distribution. Namely, for its calculation one will need to know p in order to get (8).
This will involve solving for the inverse of (7), which is a tedious task. Therefore in
such situation it is more efficient to follow the nonparametric estimation procedure
suggested by Bontemps et al. (2000). This is what we do in the present work.
3 The Data
In the present survey we use data from the Austrian Social Security Records.
They represent working history of individuals who were followed through a fifteen
year period from 1984 to 1998. All observations are made on 30.05 of each year. In-
dividual data include gender, age, income, professional affiliation, employment status
and various indicators on employment/unemployment durations. Using the guide-
lines of Ridder and van den Berg (1998) we draw two samples at 1988 and 1994 and
restore labor market histories of all sampled individuals. All individuals are divided
into the four employment status categories, namely ”employed”, ”unemployed”, ”on
study” and ”other”. In what follows we consider only ”employed” and ”unemployed”
ones. The reason is that the theoretical model is restricted to only these two states of
the labor market. It is believed that individuals who fall into the rest of two groups
have incentives different from the agents described by the model. Therefore they
should be left out.
For the same reason we exclude from our sample part-time workers. Unfortu-
nately, there is no direct indication of part-time employment in the data. To draw
samples with the least possible noise we argue that if an agent works on a full-time
basis, her income is at least as high as the legal minimum wage before tax. Thus
people, with income below the minimum are left out of consideration. Here we should
also notice that in fact there is no uniform legal minimum wage in Austria. Instead,
every year unions in all industries bargain with employers for minimum wages that
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Table 1 ”Duration Data for the Austrian Labor Market (months, individuals)”
31.05.1988 31.05.1994
Number of Individuals 3404 3726
I. EMPLOYED 3110 3361
Transitions
1) - to job 1011 731
2) - to unemployment 757 707
3) - other 616 362
Durations
Uncensored
- mean 43.189 42.324
- standard deviation 34.884 33.008
- number of observations 1146 1288
Censored
- left 622 150
4) - right 257 1085
5) - both left and right 469 476
Censored Durations Total : 1348 1711
II. UNEMPLOYED 294 365
Transitions
6) - to job 34 29
7) - other 257 288
Durations
Uncensored
- mean 6.123 5.638
- standard deviation 8.358 3.226
- number of observations 34 29
Censored
- left – –
8) - right 3 48
9) - both left and right – –
Censored Durations Total : 3 48
COMMENTS:
a) The number of employed individuals I. is a sum from 1) to 5), i.e. the sum
of completed, left-, right- and both left and right censored durations.
b) Left censored durations are fully absorbed by the sum from 1) to 3), i.e.
the sum of right-observed durations.
c) The number of unemployed individuals II. is a sum from 6) to 9), i.e. again
the sum of completed, left-, right- and both left and right censored durations.
d) Total number of individuals is a sum of I. and II.
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should be paid in respective industries throughout the whole year. As an approxima-
tion for a single minimum wage we take an average of agreed within-industry wages,
which are available from the annual reports of the Austrian Central Statistical Office.
The described processing results in two wage and duration data samples with 3404
(294) employed (unemployed) at 30.05.88 and 3726 (365) employed (unemployed) at
30.05.94. Summary statistics of the duration lengths is given in Table 1.
There are two problems with the resulting samples. The first one is a so called
”length-biasedness” of duration data, which is connected with our way of sampling the
durations. The problem is such that the spells with the longer length have in general
higher probability to be included into the sample. To overcome this problem we
construct the likelihood on the basis of the joint distribution of elapsed and residual
durations as suggested by Ridder (1984). The treatment of length-biasedness is
described in details in Section 4.1. The second problem is that the wages in the
original data set are top-coded. Right censoring amounts to about 10% in both
samples. This makes direct application of the nonparametric estimation procedure
of Bontemps et al. (2000) problematic. Our proposed solution to this problem is
presented in Section 4.2.
4 Estimation Methodology
Structural parameters {λ0, λ1, δ} are estimated from the econometric model built
on wage and duration data. General approach to the construction of the likelihood
is based on Lancaster (1990) and Ridder and van den Berg (1998). Additionally we
discuss modifications, which are necessary to account for the particularities of our
data.
4.1 The Likelihood
The backbone process of the model is Poisson, so waiting time between any two
adjacent events is exponentially distributed with parameter θ. Though, due to the
non-randomness of the sample this property can not be applied directly. Instead
we follow Ridder (1984) and analyze a joint distribution of elapsed (te) and residual
(tr) durations of a spell. On the distribution of the elapsed duration it is known
that certain time te ago there was a renewal of states and since then an individual
spent at least te in a new state. Renewal probability for Poi(θ) is shown to be equal
to θ. On the distribution of the residual duration our knowledge is that given a
certain elapsed time te an individual spends in this state additional time tr (tr > 0).
Therefore appropriate densities are:
Elapsed: f(te) = θe−θte
Residual: f(tr|te) = θe−θtr , tr > 0
Joint: f(te, tr) = θ2e−θ(te+tr), tr > 0
Hazard of Exp(θ) is θ, so for unemployed individuals hazard of exit from current
state is just the arrival rate of job offer i.e. θ = λ0. For employed individuals
hazard of exit from current job is a sum of the transition intensity to a job, which
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pays higher wage (i.e. arrival of acceptable job offer), and the transition intensity to
unemployment. So: θ = λ1F¯ (w) + δ.
To formulate likelihood contributions of unemployed (Lun) and employed (Lempl)
individuals we also notice that the probability of encountering unemployed agent in
equilibrium is δ (δ + λ0)
−1. Then the probability of meeting an employed individual
who works at the observed wage is λ0g(w) (δ + λ0)
−1. Additionally, to account
for multiple destinations in the cases of transition from job to job and from job to
unemployment the likelihood contribution of employed individual should be multiplied
with the transition probabilities:
pij→u = δδ+λ1F¯ (w) and pij→j =
λ1F¯ (w)
δ+λ1F¯ (w)
To account for censored durations, in case of left censoring we drop the renewal
probability and in case of right censoring we change residual density by its survivor.
With these results Lun and Lempl individuals become:
Lun = δ
δ + λ0
λ2−dr−dl0 exp {−λ0(te + tr)} f(w)1−dr (9)
Lempl = λ0g(w)
δ + λ0
[
δ + λ1F¯ (w)
]1−dl exp{− [δ + λ1F¯ (w)] (te+tr)} [[λ1F¯ (w)]dt δ1−dt]1−dr
(10)
Here dl = 1, if a spell is left-censored, 0 otherwise; dr = 1, if a spell is right-censored,
0 otherwise; dt = 1 if there is a job-to-job transition, 0 otherwise.
Using steady state identity for distributions (2), we substitute unknown wage offer
distribution (F ) and density (f) with expressions containing earnings distribution (G)
and density (g). Such substitution enables us using a suggested by Bontemps et al.
(2000) ”nonparametric 3-step procedure” of structural parameters estimation. On its
first step we compute non-parametric estimates of g(w) andG(w). On the second step
we substitute values of g(w) and G(w) in the likelihood function with their estimates
from the step one and maximize the likelihood with respect to λ0, λ1 and δ. On the
third step equilibrium outcomes (4) – (7) derived from the theory are evaluated using
estimates from the steps one and two.
As already mentioned in Section 2, application of this estimation procedure simpli-
fies calculations greatly. Moreover, Bontemps et al. (2000) argue that nonparametric
procedure gives the highest possible fit to the observed data. In our analysis we can
actually test this claim, comparing the estimated equilibrium wage offer distributions
with their assumed parametric counterparts. We return to this issue in Section 5.3.
Finally we comment on the estimation of the support bounds of earnings distri-
bution. Bowlus et al. (1995) suggest that R = min(w) and w = max(w). In the
present paper we rather use average of agreed within-industry minimum wages as an
estimator for R. For w we keep w = max(w). Following Bowlus et al. (1995), appli-
cation of max(w) leads to non-normality of MLE of parameters of interest. Therefore
we bootstrap standard errors.
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4.2 Nonparametric Features of the Likelihood and the Prob-
lem of Top-Coded Wages
It would be straightforward to estimate the model now if there were no additional
complication connected with the data. As mentioned in Section 3, about 10% of top
earnings observations are censored. Absence of information on the wages from the
upper decile of earnings distribution makes non-parametric estimation of its right tail
unfeasible. To solve this problem we suggest to approximate the tail by some known
distribution. Fortunately, properties of earnings distribution allow doing so. As
Fichtenbaum and Shahidi (1988) suggest, common practice would be to approximate
it by the right tail of Pareto distribution. So we will informally split the support of
G(w) in two intervals: on the first interval we use nonparametric estimates of g(w)
and G(w), on the second one g(w) and G(w) are to be of a Pareto form.
Consider the first interval. With presence of right censoring in the observed
income natural nonparametric estimator of earnings distribution is a Product-Limit
Estimator. To estimate the density we follow Padgett (1988), who suggests a version
of a Blume-Susarla estimator suited to the case when right censoring is not random
and the censoring threshold is the same constant. Formally:
g˜(w) =
[
nh−1
] n∑
j=1
K
(
w −Wj
h
)
[Ij = 1] (11)
where Ij is an indicator function, which takes value 1 if wj is less then the value of
the censoring threshold and zero otherwise. Padgett (1988) justifies an application of
Gaussian kernel for (12). Additionally, Vuong et al. (2000) show that whenever the
distribution has a compact set as a support any kernel density estimator is asymptot-
ically downward biased towards tails. Bontemps et al. (2000) state that this bias is
precisely E [gˆ(w)]→ g(w)2 and suggest the following bias-corrected kernel estimator:
gˆ(w) = g˜(w)
[
Φ
(
x− w
h
)]−1
(12)
In view of right censoring and subsequent Pareto approximation (12) presents a ver-
sion of the estimator with only left tail correction making it suitable for our study.
Now consider the approximation of earnings distribution on the second interval.
The length of this interval is determined by log-log plot of 1− Gˆ(w). By the property
of Pareto distribution the approximation is justified only on the segment where ln(1−
Gˆ(w)) is linear against ln(w). In our study linearity of ln(1− Gˆ(w)) amounts to top
20% of wages in both samples. By substitution of ln(1 − Gˆ(w) into the equation
linear in ln(w) both scale and shape parameters of Pareto distribution are estimated
by NLS.
With knowledge of the exact form of Pareto approximate we specify likelihood
contributions of individuals with top-coded earnings in a standard way. If the wage
is top-coded the individual contribution to the likelihood is P (W ≥ wcens, te, tr). If,
however, the wage is observed but still falls in the second interval, the likelihood
contribution is the same as (10) with the only difference that now Pareto pdf and cdf
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will be substituting g(w) and G(w). This implies that contribution of all employed
workers to the likelihood is2
Lempl =
∏
{A}
Lempli(ξ|tei , tri , g(wi), G(wi))
×
∏
{B}
Lempli(ξ|wi, tei , tri)

×
∏
{C}
[∫ w
wcens
f(ξ|wi, tei , tri)dw
]
pii
 (13)
where {A} is the set of individuals for who earnings density and distribution were
calculated nonparametrically (about 80% of all employed), {B} ∪ {C} is the set of
individuals for who Pareto approximation of earnings distribution was applied (ap-
proximately 20% all employed). Within {B} ∪ {C} subset {B} contains individuals
with observed wages (≈10% of all) and subset {C} contains individuals with top-
coded wages (≈10% of all). In the last square bracket pii represents an appropriate
probability term, discussed in Section 4.1.
Contribution of all unemployed agents to the likelihood is
Lun =
∏
{U}
Luni(ξ|tei , tri) (14)
As there were no instances of transition from unemployment to a job with top-coded
wage in this particular study, (14) does not take an account for that. Otherwise its
construction would have been the same as in (13).
4.3 The Likelihood and Observed Heterogeneity
Knowledge of estimated parameters is already sufficient to describe labor market
equilibrium empirically. Though, having a single parameter {λ0, λ1, δ} to approxi-
mate the whole set of individual-specific parameters {{λ0i}, {λ1i}, {δi}}, i = 1, ... n,
may be too restrictive, because even observed heterogeneity of employees is neglected.
Theoretical model assumes that all the workers are homogeneous with respect to op-
portunity cost of employment. However, they may be different with respect to gender,
age, skills etc. Therefore, to make more precise inference we suggest to extend an
econometric specification and allow for observed heterogeneity. To do so we borrow
from the idea of Ridder, van den Berg (1998) and treat the observed qualities as
covariates. Structural parameters of the model then could be specified as follows
λ0 = exp(Xβ1), λ1 = exp(Xβ2), δ = exp(Xβ3)
In the present work we study variation of structural parameters induced by age
and gender. Thus, X consists of the constant, age and gender variables. Notice that
if X contains the constant only, the whole specification reduces to the basic model,
described in Section 4.2-3. In practice we estimate the basic model as a special case
of the extended one. The results of homogeneous model estimation and estimation
in presence of covariates are reported in Section 5.1 and 5.2 respectively.
2For convenience of notation here ξ ≡ {λ0, λ1, δ}.
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5 Estimation Results and Discussion
The model is estimated for data collected at two different time points – 31.05.88
and 31.05.94. This allows comparing equilibrium outcomes and on their evolution.
In what follows we report the transformed estimation results, which are more suitable
for economic interpretation. Immediate results are presented in Table A1 of the
Appendix.
5.1 Estimation Results – The Model with HomogeneousWork-
ers
In Table 2 we report the reciprocals of estimated parameters of the model with
homogeneous workers. We start our interpretation from unemployment durations.
Following Mortensen and Neumann (1988) mean employment duration is just a recip-
rocal hazard of exit from unemployment λ−10 . From Table 2 we see that the expected
length of unemployment significantly increased from 5.5 to 12 months. This fact
may have two possible explanations. On one hand it may become preferable to stay
longer in unemployment due to an increased generosity of a benefit system. On the
other, however, it may become more difficult to find a job due to an increased com-
petition on the market or cyclicity. According to Winter-Ebmer (1998), even very
big increases of benefit duration in Austria are not able to cause proportional (and
sometimes even significant) increase in unemployment duration. Furthermore, if we
take the ratio of unemployed to employed individuals as an indicator of market activ-
ity, we can see that these make 0.103 and 0.098 for 1988 and 1994 respectively. This
does not indicate a slowdown of economy in the second period if compared to the first
one. Therefore we may conclude that over the last decade the Austrian labor market
became more demanding to a quality of workers.
Table 2 ”Estimated Frictional Parameters”
Sample 1988 Sample 1994
1/λ0 5.47210 (0.36245) 12.28694 (0.27535)
[4.968, 5.951] [11.660, 12.824]
1/λ1 33.19244 (1.60169) 36.59468 (0.82008)
[29.801, 36.682] [33.070, 40.204]
1/δ 130.75113 (3.09881) 119.59049 (2.68002)
[127.657, 133.752] [116.890, 122.211]
log(Likelihood) − 37246.69 − 45091.92
(standard errors of parameters in parenthesis; bootstrap 95% con-
fidence intervals based on 1000 replications in square brackets)
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Inference about expected employment durations predicted by the model is less
straightforward. By the same argument of Mortensen and Neumann (1988) expected
job duration is equal to the reciprocal hazard of exit to a better job [λ1F¯ (w)]−1. So,
its calculation now presumes a knowledge of wage offer distribution. Even though it is
possible to estimate offer distribution in this setting (see Figures 1-2 of the Appendix),
all inference in the existing literature was so far based only on the reciprocal employed
search intensity λ−11 . In the present paper we rather try to consider [λ1F¯ (wi)]
−1
and link job duration with possible wage offer. This extension should give more
comprehensive description of the expected duration of employment. To make the
estimated expected durations comparable across time we evaluate F¯ (wi) at the wages,
which are the averages of respective wage deciles of the earnings distribution. Table
3 presents the lengths of expected job durations (in months) of an agent, who earns
average income of each and every decile. Visual presentation of these results is given
in Figure 3 of the Appendix.
Table 3 ”Estimated Expected Job Durations At Given Income (months)”
Average Earnings Expected Job Expected Job
Over Deciles of Earnings Duration (1988) Duration (1994)
Distribution
1 42.43017 (1.70097) 44.34061 (1.85277)
[38.852, 45.924] [40.599, 47.971]
2 64.72474 (2.00067) 62.51731 (2.10056)
[60.816, 68.505] [58.503, 66.371]
3 93.90406 (2.47684) 86.27050 (2.47232)
[89.605, 98.098] [81.933, 90.398]
4 133.1867 (3.19751) 116.1938 (2.98851)
[128.286, 138.0291] [111.404, 120.698]
5 186.7297 (4.24806) 155.8619 (3.71915)
[180.952, 192.634] [150.405, 161.018]
6 266.2852 (5.87089) 238.1784 (5.31393)
[259.004, 273.759] [231.376, 244.624]
7 395.2196 (8.55978) 337.0235 (7.28666)
[385.520, 405.617] [328.266, 345.112]
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8 648.1672 (13.9034) 511.3346 (10.8200)
[633.532, 663.735] [499.527, 522.5928]
9 1335.316⇔∞ 919.9729⇔∞
(28.47675) (19.15996)
10 3769.770⇔∞ 1967.350⇔∞
(80.25259) (40.63293)
(standard errors of parameters in parenthesis, bootstrap 95% con-
fidence intervals base on 1000 replications in square brackets)
Firstly we notice that expected job duration of agents, whose earnings belong to
upper two deciles, exceeds potential job tenure (more than 60 years). This result is
quite natural, though. It just tells that people, who earn very high income practically
loose an incentive to search for a better job and are happy to stay on the current job
forever. Of bigger interest are the results for the rest of the workers. From both
Table 3 and Figure 3 we readily obtain the verification of the reduction in mean
job durations over the last decade. Thus we match the fact reported earlier by Url
and Mayrhuber (1999). In our search equilibrium framework this hypothesis can
be also formally tested. Bootstrap confidence intervals for the expected durations
indicate that the significant departure from the old mean starts already for those,
whose income belongs to the third decile of earnings distribution. Thus, recently
nearly 65% of the population revised its expectations about the optimal job duration.
The model suggests that such decline is due to the belief that higher wage offer
becomes more possible and increased search intensity will therefore be rewarded.
This conclusion is furthermore supported by the fact that in 1994 comparatively to
1988 we register a loss of producers monopsony power in wage setting3 (see Figure 4),
which also implies a potentially higher wage offer. Observing further the pattern of
changes in the expected job durations we may see that expected job duration of the
poorest agents did not reduce, but to the contrary increased. This increase is not
significant yet, but it may have an interesting interpretation, implying a strengthening
of competition among labor suppliers. Those who are less competitive and earn the
lowest wages foresee that it will be difficult to get a better job and so prepare to
stay longer in their relatively poor conditions. Such a reverse change could also be
interpreted as a possible tendency towards state dependence of low-wage earners.
Detected significant increase in job mobility of the workers, who earn average and
higher wages brings us to the next point of our analysis. Namely, we ask a question
whether this increase have caused any changes in equilibrium profit of the firms. To
answer we inspect a profit ratio of a representative firm. Using (3), (4) and some
algebra we write this ratio as
pi∗
pi
=
M∗/N∗
M/N
p∗ − w∗
Iw (p− w)
[
κ∗0(1 + κ0)
κ0(1 + κ∗0)
(1 + κ∗1)(1 + κ1F¯ (w))
(1 + κ1)(1 + κ∗1F¯ ∗(w∗))
]
(15)
3Index of monopsony power is defined as (p− w)/p. See Bontemps et al. (2000) for details.
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where pi∗ and pi are the profits at the two different periods of time (asterisk defines
values of 1994). The expression in square brackets is entirely dependent on observed
wages, estimated parameters and estimated offer distribution. Productivity in the ra-
tio of productivity-wage differences is available from (5). To make productivity-wage
differences comparable the denominator is scaled by the index of agreed minimum
wages Iw. Finally M/N represents a total labor force over the number of active
firms.
Again, the profit ratio is constructed for the ten representative firms that belong to
ten different deciles of the support of productivity distribution. Each firm operates on
the average productivity of its own decile. From the plot of this ratio (see Appendix,
Figure 5) we see that for all firms starting from the third decile profit decline over time
is substantial. This behavior is observed along with the increase of labor mobility of
the workers who earn wages of the third decile of earnings distribution, and higher.
Therefore the main message is that excessive labor mobility may indeed negatively
affect producers. Moreover the ratio demonstrates that for the producers who employ
more productive, read skilled, labor the loss is higher. Naturally this relationship
should not hold for the low-skilled workers since in this case firms do not invest into
the human capital of their employees. This fact is also supported by the results. We
register no reduction in profits of low-productivity firms.
Thus search equilibrium supports the conjecture of Url and Mayrhuber (1999)
about negative relationship between high labor mobility and profitability. Though,
we need to notice that in this framework we can not separate the mobility effect from
possible exogenous loss of monopsony power.
5.2 Estimation Results – The Model with Observed Hetero-
geneity
In this part of the work we do not consider firms and focus on the duration
dynamics of heterogeneous workers only. We suggest that workers are different with
respect to their age and gender and use the specification from Section 4.3 to re-
estimate the model. Direct estimation results presented in Table A2 of Appendix are
again used to recover the expected durations predicted for heterogeneous groups by
the model. These durations are reported in Tables 4 and 5 for 1988 and 1994 years
respectively.
Table 4 ”Expected Durations of Heterogeneous Agents: 1988 (months)”
Mean Unempl. Mean Empl. Mean Waiting Time
Duration Duration until Match Break
Age
Males
30 3.016 (0.084) 142.022 (2.700) 102.934 (6.465)
45 6.634 (0.088) 251.169 (5.747) 153.230 (6.465)
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Females
30 5.137 (0.134) 575.467 (2.556) 146.271 (6.466)
45 11.301 (0.137) 1006.91 =∞ 217.743 (6.466)
(5.583)
(standard errors in parenthesis)
To demonstrate the age effect we evaluate expected durations for both man and
women at 30 and 45 noticing that overall effect of age on any duration is positive.
This conclusion comes from the negative sign of the age coefficient in 1/exp(.) trans-
formation. The results for expected employment duration presented in Tables 4-5
are computed for both men and women that earn an average income.
Table 5 ”Expected Durations of Heterogeneous Agents: 1994 (months)”
Mean Unempl. Mean Empl. Mean Waiting Time
Duration Duration Until Match Break
Age
Males
30 4.662 (0.066) 157.181 (3.470) 77.801 (2.744)
45 13.564 (0.080) 285.713 (9.632) 150.795 (2.744)
Females
30 8.304 (0.106) 390.218 (3.192) 109.526 (2.744)
45 24.160 (0.115) 709.31 =∞ 212.285 (2.744)
(9.206)
(standard errors in parenthesis)
As it may have been expected we see that within each year males are more mobile
than females no matter if employed or unemployed. Moreover, the difference in the
length of expected employment duration between men and women is increasing with
age of both. This implies that with time females become relatively less ambitious in
finding a better job comparatively to males. Moreover, it could be interesting to see
that difference in the length of expected unemployment duration between men and
women does not depend on age. This implies that attitude to unemployment for
both genders remains the same all the time.
A striking result is obtained by looking at the dynamics of male-female job mobil-
ity. From the previous analysis we remember the overall reduction in the expected
employment duration. Now observing males only we can see that in 1994 compara-
tively to 1988 their mean job duration did not fall at all. At the same time female
expected employment duration experienced about 30% decrease. Thus there were
exclusively females who contributed to the above mentioned overall decline. So we
may suggest that over the last decade women in the Austrian labor market became
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more competitive. Alternatively, certain entry barriers in climbing up the career lad-
der might have been reduced. Be it first or second, this finding in any case positively
characterizes the market performance.
5.3 An Attempt of Sensitivity Analysis
The literature on the estimation aspects of search equilibrium models with con-
tinuous productivity dispersion is clearly an emerging one. Insofar it was advised
to go through a nonparametric procedure for a computational simplicity reasons. It
is also believed that nonparametric approach performs better then any parametric
alternative. Though neither of existing papers have ever presented a formal justifi-
cation of these claims. To check whether it is indeed so we compare the estimated
wage offer distributions with their parametric counterparts. In the case of wage offer
distribution the most natural candidate could be a Pareto family (see Figures 1-2).
Table 6 ”Tests of Goodness of Fit for the Wage Offer Distribution”
Sample 1988: Sample 1994
Test H0 : α = w, β = 3.589 H0 : α = w, β = 3.359
Test Statistic p-Value Test Statistic p-Value
D-Kolmogorov 0.13360 0.00000 0.16298 0.00000
Kuiper 0.13872 0.00000 0.16425 0.00000
Test Statistic 5% Cr. Value Test Statistic 5% Cr. Value
Cramer-
von Mises 3.68023 0.461 5.1412 0.461
In Table 6 we present the results of testing the wage offer distribution against
Pareto(w,α), where scale parameter of Pareto distribution is fixed to the lowest wage
paid and shape parameter is the one that minimizes the reported statistics. The
decision is based on Kolmogorov D, Kuiper and Cramer-von Mises test statistics.
All three tests uniformly reject the hypothesis of the equivalence of assumed and
calculated distributions. This leads to a conclusion that estimation results are indeed
sensitive to the distributional assumptions on F (w) (alternatively Γ(p)). So we justify
that consistent estimation of the parameters of interest may not be insured unless the
nonparametric procedure is applied.
6 Concluding Remarks
In the present work we use a search equilibrium model with continuous produc-
tivity dispersion to describe empirically the dynamics of the Austrian labor market.
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It turns out that the model does well in tracking changes in firms profitability and
explanation of their possible reason – excessive labor mobility and changes in market
power of the parties. This makes it superior to the empirical duration models, mostly
applicable to the description of the labor supply side only. The model is also com-
petitive in explanation of the variations in the mean employment and unemployment
durations. Specifically it provides a clear-cut inference on the mean employment
durations and their dependence on the offered wages. This advantage allows us to
study in details labor mobility of workers and analyze career advancement.
The work discovers that over the last decade competition on the labor supply side
of the Austrian labor market became stronger, which increased frictions in unem-
ployed search. It also indicates significant changes in employed search, which was
naturally expected given the results on big declines in employment durations available
from the empirical literature. Further investigations that take into account observed
heterogeneity of workers indicate that these changes happened mostly due to the en-
hanced activity in the employed female search. This is certainly a positive tendency
in the labor market performance. Discovered shifts in labor mobility and relative loss
of producers monopsony power explain the subsequent decline in profits, enjoyed by
employers due to their more advantageous position on the market previously. Even-
tually, the model warns about possible state dependence tendency among low-paid
workers and outlines the group of those at risk.
Satisfactory overall fit of the model to the collected data suggests that estimated
structural parameters can be as well used for calibration of search equilibrium models
and subsequent policy simulations. This makes the model especially attractive for
the future studies of labor markets.
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7 Appendix
Table A.1 ”Estimation Results – Homogeneous Model”
Sample 1988 Sample 1994
Parameters Std. Errors Parameters Std. Errors
β1 −1.69966 0.06624 −2.50854 0.04287
β2 −3.50232 0.04825 −3.59990 0.04811
β3 −4.87330 0.02370 −4.78407 0.02241
Log(Likelihood) −37246.69070 −45091.92039
Parameterization: λ0 = exp{β1}, λ1 = exp{β2}, δ = exp{β3}.
Table A.2 ”Estimation Results – Extension for Observed Heterogeneity”
Sample 1988 Sample 1994
Parameters Std. Errors Parameters Std. Errors
Constant −0.05977 0.03024 0.01922 0.03179
β1: Age −0.05256 0.00292 −0.07120 0.00197
Gender 0.53272 0.12923 0.57728 0.09965
Constant −2.83424 0.20030 −2.66590 0.18967
β2: Age −0.03801 0.00578 −0.03984 0.00519
Gender 1.39920 0.11067 0.90931 0.10455
Constant −4.18976 0.09795 −3.37264 0.09410
β3: Age −0.02652 0.00261 −0.04412 0.00244
Gender 0.35138 0.05145 0.34201 0.05457
Log(Likelihood) −36965.83297 −44659.35000
Parameterization: λ0 = exp{xβ1}, λ1 = exp{xβ2}, δ = exp{xβ3}.
x = {Constant,Age,Gender}
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Graph 1 „Wage Offer and Earnings Densities for Two Samples” 
 
Graph 2 „Wage Offer and Earnings Distributions for Two Samples”
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Graph 3 “Expected Job Duration (months)” 
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Graph 4 “Index of Monopsony Power” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 5 “Profit Ratio Plot” 
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